The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot be applied efficiently. Recent years have seen the design of various truthful approximation mechanisms that rely on payments. In this article, we advocate the reconsideration of highly structured optimization problems in the context of mechanism design. We explicitly argue for the first time that, in such domains, approximation can be leveraged to obtain truthfulness without resorting to payments. This stands in contrast to previous work where payments are almost ubiquitous and (more often than not) approximation is a necessary evil that is required to circumvent computational complexity.
INTRODUCTION
We anticipate that most computer scientists and most economists will view our contribution differently, hence we initially cater to the two (complementary) points of view separately as we introduce our work.
The Computer Science Perspective. The vibrant field of algorithmic mechanism design, which originated in the work of Nisan and Ronen [2001] , deals with gametheoretic versions of (often Internet-related) optimization problems, such as task scheduling and resource allocation. In these settings, the problem input is distributed among selfish agents; the agents might lie about their private information if this serves detail later (see, e.g., [Miyagawa 2001; Moulin 1980] ). For more details, see the survey by Schummer and Vohra [2007] . 2 Economists typically gauge the quality of an outcome using Boolean properties, such as Pareto efficiency, which requires that there be no other outcome that is at least as good for all agents and strictly better for at least one agent. In particular, the existing literature on mechanism design without money typically does not attempt to quantify the quality of an outcome. Without an explicit optimization objective that measures the quality of outcomes, approximation cannot play a role.
To summarize, from the economics viewpoint, the novel component of "approximate mechanism design without money" is "approximate", which also encapsulates our focus on optimization problems.
All Together Now: What is Approximate Mechanism Design Without Money?
We consider game-theoretic optimization problems where returning the optimal solution is not strategyproof. Our main conceptual contribution is the explicit suggestion that approximation can be used to obtain strategyproofness without resorting to payments; in other words, we propose to sacrifice the optimality of the solution in order to achieve strategyproofness and (crucially) to quantify how much was sacrificed using the notion of approximation. In essence, this agenda is reminiscent of the second class of algorithmic mechanism design problems previously discussed, in the sense that approximation is seen to enable truthfulness rather than hinder it. However, our rejection of money stands in contrast to the existing work in algorithmic mechanism design (again, narrowly construed), where payments are almost ubiquitous.
The contrast with previous work in algorithmic mechanism design becomes even more striking when one considers (as we do) computationally tractable optimization problems where there is an optimal, computationally efficient, truthful, paymentbased mechanism, but there is no optimal truthful mechanism without money. Crucially, this type of problems does not fall into either of the two classes just mentioned. We therefore have a new class of problems that has previously been disregarded and, we suggest, should be considered.
Importantly, our agenda only applies to optimization problems where there exist reasonable strategyproof mechanisms without payments. In particular, we must escape social choice impossibility results, such as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975] and its variations, for example, the important paper of Barberà and Peleg [1990] regarding continuous preferences. Hence, we consider highly structured domains where these results do not hold.
Our Results. This article presents a case study in approximate mechanism design without money. Our point of departure is the literature on single-peaked preferences. Single-peaked preferences are induced by an ordering of the possible outcomes, or alternatives, on a line. For example, the alternatives can represent different candidates in a political election, and their position can reflect the position of the candidates on a political issue, from left wing to right wing. Each agent i is assumed to have a peak, which is its most preferred alternative. The ordinal preferences of agents must obey the following restriction: if an agent prefers alternative a to b, then either (i) a is the agent's peak, or (ii) a and b lie on opposite sides of the peak, or (iii) a and b lie on the same side of the peak and a is closer to the peak than b. Single-peaked preferences and their extensions have been extensively studied in the social choice literature, starting with the work of Black [1958] and Moulin [1980] ; see the surveys by Barberà [2001] and Sprumont [1995] and the references therein.
Recall that we are interested in optimization problems, and hence we restrict agents' preferences further. In the basic domain that we study, each agent i has a location x i ∈ R. Given the locations of all the agents, a mechanism selects the location y ∈ R of a facility. The cost of agent i is simply the distance |y − x i |. For example, x i might be the location of the house of agent i on a street, and y might be the location of a grocery store or a public library. We use the terminology of facility location problems, but the facility is simply an abstraction of a public good, and the same domain can also be used to represent other settings. Indeed, returning to the political election example and specializing it, x i may be the agent's desired national income tax rate on a scale between 50% (extreme left wing) and 0% (extreme right wing). Under these interpretationsand others-payments may be infeasible, for the reasons already discussed.
We study the preceding, basic setting in Section 3. We observe that choosing the median location is a group strategyproof (i.e., even coalitions of agents cannot gain by lying) mechanism that minimizes the social cost, that is, the sum of the agents' costs. However, if the goal is to minimize the maximum cost, selecting the optimal facility location-the average of the leftmost and rightmost locations-is no longer strategyproof. With respect to this objective function, we give a deterministic group strategyproof mechanism (without money) that yields an approximation ratio of 2, and provide a matching lower bound that holds even against (individually) strategyproof deterministic mechanisms (without money). Further, we give a group strategyproof randomized mechanism with an approximation ratio of 3/2 and provide a matching strategyproof lower bound. These results are summarized in Table I .
We subsequently study two natural extensions of the basic setting. In both settings, the optimal solution is not strategyproof even with respect to the social cost, and we resort to strategyproof approximation mechanisms, some straightforward and some nontrivial. Section 4 deals with a setting where two facilities must be located; the cost of an agent is its distance to the nearest one. Our main result of Section 4 is a randomized strategyproof 5/3-approximation mechanism for the maximum cost objective function. This result is notable since the mechanism (Mechanism 2) incorporates several new ideas in order to achieve strategyproofness, and, unlike other mechanisms, the difficult part of its analysis (Theorem 4.5) is the proof of strategyproofness.
Section 5 is concerned with a setting where only one facility must be located, but each agent is associated with multiple locations. For example, a real estate agent is responsible for multiple properties, and in expressing preferences for a facility would take the location of all of these properties into account. More generally, an agent is interested in optimizing the objective function with respect to its own multiset of locations, whereas the designer is interested in optimizing over the entire multiset of locations. In this section, our main results are a randomized strategyproof mechanism that yields a 2-approximation to the social cost when there are two agents that control the same number of locations, and a randomized group strategyproof mechanism that has a tight approximation ratio of 3/2 for the maximum cost. Due to the sheer number of results, we do not list them all here, but rather refer the impatient reader to Tables II and III. 
RELATED WORK
Previous and Parallel Work. The origins of the agenda of approximate mechanism design without money can be traced to several earlier papers. Dekel et al. [2010] deal with incentive compatible learning, a line of work that was followed up in recent papers Meir et al. [2010 Meir et al. [ , 2012 . It turns out that the study of incentives in general learning-theoretic domains reduces to simpler settings where strategyproof approximation mechanisms without money can be designed. There are some mathematical connections between our work and that of Dekel et al. [2010] on which we elaborate in Section 5. LeGrand et al. [2007] studied a voting setting (without money) in which it is computationally hard to compute the optimal solution. Their work focuses on complexity results and approximation algorithms, but they also mention that the optimal solution is manipulable, whereas one of their approximation algorithms (which simply chooses the best outcome for a random agent) is strategyproof. Bezáková and Dani [2005] considered the problem of allocating indivisible goods to maximize the minimum value of any agent. This is again a computationally hard problem, and some of the results are purely algorithmic, but Bezáková and Dani also provide a strategyproof approximation mechanism. While these last three papers [Bezáková and Dani 2005; Dekel et al. 2010; LeGrand et al. 2007 ] construct approximation mechanisms without payments, one of the main contributions of our article is that we properly crystallize and explicitly advocate approximate mechanism design without money.
Our agenda is reminiscent of the line of work on the frugality of mechanisms (see, e.g., [Archer and Tardos 2007; Elkind et al. 2004] in the context of buying an s-t path). This body of research deals with designing truthful mechanisms that have to pay as little as possible. One way to see our work is as taking the concept of frugality to the limit by requiring zero payments.
The domain that we study in Section 4, in which two facilities must be located on the real line, was previously studied by Miyagawa [2001] . He gave an interesting characterization of strategyproof, Pareto-optimal, and continuous mechanisms in this setting. Unfortunately, continuous mechanisms cannot give a good approximation ratio, hence we cannot technically utilize this result.
Incentives aside and taking an algorithmic point of view, the problems that we deal with are the one-dimensional Euclidean k-median and k-center problems, when the objective functions are the social cost and the maximum cost, respectively, and k = 1 (Sections 3 and 5) or k = 2 (Section 4). This may sound discouraging, but recall that we deliberately focus on relatively simple, structured problems (to avoid game-theoretic impossibilities), and the domains that we deal with are extremely well studied in the social choice literature [Barberà 2001; Sprumont 1995] . The k-median and k-center problems were extensively investigated, especially in the context of clustering, and can be approximated using sophisticated algorithms (see, e.g., [Arora et al. 1998; Bern and Eppstein 1996] ).
Some papers in Operations Research [Bandelt 1985; Bandelt and Labbé 1986; Hansen and Thisse 1981; Labbé 1985 ] deal with the question: "How bad can a Condorcet point be?" A Condorcet point is a facility location that is preferred to any other location by a majority of agents. The quality of a Condorcet point is measured by computing the ratio between its social cost and the minimum social cost. This line of work deals with settings where the agents are located on a graph; the approach is descriptive rather than algorithmic, and game-theoretic considerations are not directly taken into account.
Finally, the rather large body of work on cost sharing includes papers on strategyproof mechanisms for facility location problems that are related to ours (see, e.g., [Leonardi and Schäfer 2004; Pál and Tardos 2003] ). Cost sharing deals with groups of agents that agree to install a jointly used facility and split its cost, and thus this setting inherently assumes the availability of money.
Subsequent Work on Approximate Mechanism Design without Money.
Since an early version of this article became publicly available in November 2008, a considerable amount of work has been devoted to improving and extending our facility location results (some published papers include [Alon et al. 2010; Cheng et al. 2013; Fotakis and Tzamos 2010; Lu et al. 2009 Lu et al. , 2010 Nissim et al. 2012; Thang 2010; Todo et al. 2010] ). For example, our basic setting was first extended by Alon et al. [2010] , who considered facility location problems where one facility must be located (as in Section 3), but the agents are located on a graph; the model is identical to the one investigated by Schummer and Vohra [2002] . Alon et al. provide a randomized algorithm that gives a 2-approximation to the social cost on any graph. They also design a randomized mechanism that yields an approximation ratio of 3/2 for the maximum cost when the agents are located on a circle; this mechanism builds on our Mechanism 1.
Perhaps the two most technically relevant papers are those by Lu et al. [2009 Lu et al. [ , 2010 . Rather than outlining their results here, we discuss them in detail in Sections 4.3 and 5.3.
More importantly, the idea of approximate mechanism design without money, as first presented in our work, has subsequently been applied to various domains that are fundamentally different from the facility location setting studied here. These domains include the following.
(1) Allocation of Items [Guo and Conitzer 2010; Guo et al. 2009 ]. The agents have private additive valuation functions with respect to a set of heterogeneous items. A mechanism maps the valuations of the agents to the allocation of the items. The optimization target is the social welfare, that is, the sum of utilities. (2) Generalized Assignment [Dughmi and Ghosh 2010] . An instance is a bipartite graph, where the vertices on one side correspond to jobs and the vertices on the other correspond to machines; the agents are the jobs. Machines have capacities, and the edges have values and sizes. The edges incident to an agent are the agent's private information. A mechanism returns an assignment of jobs to machines. The goal is to maximize the social welfare. (3) Approval Voting [Alon et al. 2011] . The agents are the nodes of a directed graph, where an edge from agent i to agent j means that agent i approves, trusts, or supports j. An agent's outgoing edges are its private information. A mechanism selects a subset of agents of fixed size. An agent's utility is 1 if it is a member of the selected subset and 0 otherwise. A mechanism is considered strategyproof if an agent cannot affect its chances of being selected by misreporting its outgoing edges. The optimization target is the number of incoming edges to the selected subset. This setting addresses realistic problems that arise in the context of directed social networks (such as Twitter), reputation systems, and Web search. (4) Matching [Ashlagi et al. 2010; Caragiannis et al. 2011] . Each agent controls a private subset of vertices in an undirected graph. A mechanism outputs a matching on the graph. An agent's utility is the number of its vertices that are matched. A mechanism is strategyproof if an agent cannot benefit by hiding vertices, where the assumption is that an agent can privately match hidden vertices among themselves. The optimization target is the social welfare, that is, (twice) the size of the matching. (5) Scheduling [Koutsoupias 2011] . The agents are (unrelated) machines, and there is a set of tasks such that machine i requires time t ij to execute task j. A mechanism maps the reported execution times to an allocation of tasks to machines. The cost of an agent is the sum of execution times of its assigned tasks, and the goal is to minimize the social cost or the maximum cost (also known in this context as the makespan).
THE BASIC SETTING
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents. Each agent i ∈ N has a location x i ∈ R. We refer to the collection x = x 1 , . . . , x n as the location profile. 3 A (deterministic) mechanism in this simple setting is a function f : R n → R, that is, a function that maps a given location profile to a location of a facility. If the facility is located at y, the cost of agent i ∈ N is cost(y, x i ) = |y − x i |.
A randomized mechanism is a function f from R n to probability distributions over R. In other words, a randomized mechanism allows us to randomly specify the location of the facility for every given location profile. If f (x) = P, where P is a probability distribution, the cost of agent i ∈ N is defined as the expected distance from the location of i, that is, cost(P,
A mechanism f is strategyproof if an agent can never benefit from reporting a false location, regardless of the strategies of the other agents. In the current setting, this means that for all x ∈ R n , for all i ∈ N, and for all
. , x n is the vector of the locations of all agents in N \ {i}.
A mechanism is group strategyproof if for any location profile x and any coalition S ⊆ N, there is no joint deviation x S of the agents in S such that all the agents in S gain, that is, for all x ∈ R n , for all S ⊆ N, and for all
Notice that it is possible to define (strong) group strategyproofness by asking that it cannot be the case that all the deviating agents do not lose and at least one gains. Some of our group strategyproofness results do not hold under this stronger definition. However, our (weaker) notion of strategyproofness is very common in social choice, since in settings where payments (and in particular, side payments) cannot be made, an agent that does not strictly gain has no incentive to become a member of the deviating coalition.
In this article, we shall be interested in strategyproof mechanisms that also do well with respect to optimizing one of two objective functions: minimizing the social cost, or minimizing the maximum cost.
The social cost of a facility location y ∈ R n with respect to the profile x ∈ R n is sc(y, x) = i∈N cost(y, x i ); the social cost of a distribution P with respect to x is sc(P, x) = E y∼P [ sc(y, x)]. The maximum cost of a y with respect to x is mc(y, x) = max i∈N cost(y, x i ), whereas the maximum cost of P with respect to x is mc(P, x) = E y∼P [ mc(y, x)].
Social Cost
We warm up by tackling an easy question: is there a strategyproof mechanism that minimizes the social cost? The solution is very simple: choose the median location in x, which we shall denote by med(x). Indeed, assume that n is odd, n = 2k + 1. Any point that is to the left of the median has higher social cost than that of the median, since it is further away from at least k + 1 locations and closer to at most k locations, and the same holds for any point to the right of the median. If n is even, n = 2k, and without loss of generality
is an optimal facility location. In this case, when we refer to the median med(x), we mean the leftmost point of the optimal interval, that is, the kth order statistic.
As noted in Section 1, the structure of the preferences of our agents is known in the social choice literature as single peaked: the peak, or bliss point, of agent i is at x i , and the closer a location is to x i , the more preferred it is. It has long been known that when agents have single-peaked preferences, the selection of the kth order statistic for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n} is group strategyproof [Moulin 1980 ]; this is also very easy to verify. In particular, selecting the median peak is group strategyproof. Hence, in our basic setting, the social cost can in fact be minimized using a group strategyproof mechanism.
Maximum Cost
The second objective function that we consider is minimizing the maximum cost. Here, the situation becomes nontrivial, even in the basic setting previously presented. We will first investigate deterministic mechanisms and then turn our attention to randomized mechanisms.
Deterministic Mechanisms. For a location profile x ∈ R n , denote the leftmost location in x by lt(x) = min i∈N x i , and the rightmost location by rt(x) = max i∈N x i . Furthermore, denote the center of the interval [ lt(x), rt(x)] by cen(x) = (lt(x) + rt(x))/2. Given x, the solution that minimizes the maximum cost is cen(x). Unfortunately, this solution is not (even individually) strategyproof. Indeed, if N = {1, 2}, x 1 = 0, and x 2 = 1, agent 2 can move the optimal solution to its own location by reporting x 2 = 2.
A trivial, group strategyproof solution would be to choose any kth order statistic for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For reasons that will become apparent in the sequel, we choose the first-order statistic, that is, lt(x). Notice that any point in the interval [ lt(x), rt(x)] would give a 2-approximation to the maximum cost. We have therefore obtained the following straightforward result.
is a group strategyproof 2-approximation mechanism for the maximum cost.
Given the simplicity of our group strategyproof, 2-approximation mechanism, it may be somewhat surprising that no (even individually) strategyproof mechanism can do better, as the following theorem asserts. THEOREM 3.2. Let N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2. Any deterministic strategyproof mechanism f : R n → R has an approximation ratio of at least 2 for the maximum cost.
PROOF. We first deal with the case where N = {1, 2}, and subsequently touch on extending the proof to an arbitrary n.
Assume for contradiction that f : R n → R is a strategyproof mechanism and has an approximation ratio smaller than 2 for the maximum cost. Consider the location profile x, where x 1 = 0 and x 2 = 1. Assume without loss of generality that f (x) = 1/2 + , ≥ 0. Now, consider the profile x , where x 1 = 0 and x 2 = 1/2 + . The optimum is the average of the two locations, namely, 1/4 + /2, which has a maximum cost of 1/4 + /2. If the mechanism is to achieve an approximation ratio better than 2, the facility must be placed in (0, 1/2 + ). In that case, given the profile x , agent 2 can benefit by reporting x 2 = 1, thus moving the solution to 1/2 + , in contradiction to strategyproofness.
In order to extend this result to an arbitrary n, simply locate all the agents N \ {1, 2} at 1/2 in each one of the profiles previously described. All of the arguments given go through smoothly.
Randomized Mechanisms. We presently turn to randomized mechanisms; we shall demonstrate that randomization allows us to break the deterministic lower bound of 2, given by Theorem 3.2. Indeed, we focus on the following mechanism.
Mechanism 1. Given x, return lt(x) with probability 1/4, rt(x) with probability 1/4, and cen(x) with probability 1/2.
It is possible to demonstrate that Mechanism 1 is group strategyproof. Moreover, the mechanism gives a 3/2-approximation, well below the deterministic lower bound. THEOREM 3.3. Mechanism 1 is a group strategyproof 3/2-approximation mechanism for the maximum cost.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is based on the observation that if there is a contraction of the interval over which the mechanism randomizes, then the agents at the boundaries must be members of the deviating coalition.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.3. By scaling the distances, we can assume without loss of generality that lt(x) = 0 and rt(x) = 1. We shall first prove the claim about the approximation ratio.
The optimum cost is 1/2, whereas the expected cost of the algorithm is
The approximation ratio is therefore 3/2. We now turn to proving group strategyproofness. Let S ⊆ N be a coalition. We must demonstrate that the agents in S cannot all gain by deviating.
A crucial observation is that given x ∈ R n , the only deviations that affect the outcome of the mechanism are the ones that modify the locations of the extreme agents lt(x) and rt(x). The location of lt(x) can always be pushed to the left, and the location of rt(x) can always be pushed to the right. However, lt(x) can be pushed to the right only if the leftmost agent is a member of the deviating coalition S, that is, argmin i∈N x i ∩ S = ∅. Similarly, rt(x) can be pushed to the left only if the rightmost agent is a member of S.
Let x ∈ R n and let x ∈ R n where, for every i = S, x i = x i . Further, let 1 = lt(x) − lt(x ), and 2 = rt(x ) − rt(x). We consider four cases.
Case 2. 1 < 0 and 2 ≥ 0. In this case, it must be true that the leftmost agent, which is located at 0, is a member of S. It is obvious that this agent cannot benefit from the deviation, and in fact must strictly lose, since the leftmost point, the center, and possibly the rightmost point are all moving further away from the agent's location at 0.
Case 3. 1 ≥ 0 and 2 < 0. The case is symmetric to Case 2.
Case 4. 1 < 0 and 2 < 0. In this case, the leftmost agent, located at 0, and the rightmost agent, located at 1, must both be members of S. We shall demonstrate that they cannot both gain from the deviation.
Similarly,
We conclude that
While the theorem implies that randomization allows us to drop the feasible strategyproof approximation ratio from 2 to 3/2, we can also show that this is as far as randomization can take us. THEOREM 3.4. Let N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2. Any randomized strategyproof mechanism has an approximation ratio of at least 3/2 for the maximum cost.
In order to prove the theorem, we require two straightforward lemmata.
LEMMA 3.5. Let N = {1, 2}, and let x ∈ R 2 . Let P be a probability distribution over R such that
Then the expected maximum cost is
PROOF. For every y ∈ R, we have that the maximum cost is y −
. Therefore, the expected maximum cost is
LEMMA 3.6. Let N = {1, 2}, and let x 1 , x 2 ∈ R. Let P be a probability distribution over R. Then there exists i ∈ N such that
PROOF. Let Y be a random variable distributed according to P, and let X 1 and X 2 be random variables defined by
The lemma directly follows.
We are now ready to prove the theorem. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.4. As in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we first deal with the case N = {1, 2} and then extend the proof to more agents.
Let f be a randomized mechanism. Consider the profile x ∈ R 2 , where x 1 = 0 and x 2 = 1. We have that f (x) = P, where P is a distribution over R. By Lemma 3.6, there exists x i for i ∈ N, without loss of generality x 2 , such that cost(P, x 2 ) ≥ 1/2. Now, consider the profile where x 1 = 0, x 2 = 2. By strategyproofness, the expected distance from 1 must still be at least 1/2, otherwise agent 2 gains from deviating from x 2 to x 2 . By Lemma 3.5 (with ≥ 1/2), the expected maximum cost is therefore at least 3/2, whereas the optimum has a cost of 1; it follows that the approximation ratio of f is at least 3/2. In order to extend the proof to an arbitrary number of agents n, we simply set the locations of the additional agents to be 1/2; the proof works as before. Table I summarizes the results of Section 3. Our results in this section are completely tight. As we move on to significantly more-involved settings, obtaining tight bounds inevitably becomes much more difficult.
Discussion
Interestingly, if payments are allowed, it is possible to obtain a truthful optimal solution even for the maximum cost by using VCG-like payments: each agent i ∈ N pays the distance between the optimal facility location when x is reported and the optimal facility location when x −i is reported.
EXTENSION I: TWO FACILITIES
In this section, we investigate a first natural extension to the setting examined in Section 3: locating two facilities instead of just one. A deterministic mechanism is now a function f : R n → R 2 , that is, the mechanism returns the locations y ∈ R 2 of both facilities given a location profile. If y = y 1 , y 2 , the cost of an agent is its distance to the nearest facility: cost(y, x i ) = min{|y 1 −x i |, |y 2 −x i |}. We usually assume that y 1 ≤ y 2 .
Similarly, a randomized mechanism returns a probability distribution P over R 2 , and the cost of an agent is its expected distance to the nearest facility. We redefine sc(y, x) and mc(y, x) in the obvious way according to the new definition of cost given previously.
Social Cost
As before, we shall first look into minimizing the social cost in a strategyproof way. Let us first consider the algorithmic problem of locating two facilities in a way that minimizes the social cost, disregarding incentives. This problem is quite simple, although this may not be immediately apparent. Indeed, given a location profile x ∈ R n , let the optimal facility locations be y 1 , y 2 ∈ R, y 1 ≤ y 2 . Informally, we can associate with y 1 a multiset of locations L(x) {x 1 , . . . , x n } (for "left") whose cost is computed with respect to y 1 , and similarly associate with y 2 a multiset of locations R(x) {x 1 , . . . , x n } (for "right") whose cost is computed with respect to y 2 , such that for all x i ∈ L, x j ∈ R, x i ≤ x j . Now, y 1 is the median of L(x) and y 2 is the median of R(x). Hence, it is sufficient to optimize over the n − 1 possible choices of L(x) and R(x).
Despite the algorithmic simplicity of the problem, and in contrast to the single facility setting, minimizing the social cost in the two facility setting is not strategyproof. Intuitively, the reason is that it is impossible to elicit the structure of L(x) and R(x) in a strategyproof way. The next theorem in fact establishes a lower bound of 3/2 − O(1/n). THEOREM 4.1. Let N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 3. In the two facility setting, any deterministic strategyproof mechanism f : R n → R 2 has an approximation ratio of at least 3/2 − O(1/n) for the social cost.
PROOF. Let n ≥ 3. We construct a location profile x ∈ R n as follows: x 1 = −1, x 2 = 1, and x i = 0 for all i ∈ N \ {1, 2}. The optimal solution has a social cost of 1. Let f be a mechanism, and let f (x) = y 1 , y 2 ∈ R 2 . If |y 1 | ≥ 2 n−2 , and |y 2 | ≥ 2 n−2 , then sc(f (x), x) ≥ 2, hence the mechanism's approximation ratio is at least 2.
By this, we can assume without loss of generality that |y 1 | ≤ 2 n−2 . Furthermore, assume without loss of generality that y 2 ≤ 0. We consider a deviation of agent 2 to x 2 = 3/2. Let f (x 2 , x −2 ) = y 1 , y 2 . The optimal solution 0, 3/2 has a social cost of 1, therefore we can assume once again that |y 1 | ≤ 2 n−2 . In addition, cost( y 1 , y 2 , x 2 ) ≥ 1 − 2 n−2 , hence by strategyproofness we have that |y 2 − x 2 | ≥ 1 − 2 n−2 . It follows that either y 2 ≥ 2 − 2 n−2 , or y 2 ≤ 2 n−2 . In both cases, we get that
hence the approximation ratio is at least 3/2 − O(1/n).
It can be verified that a group strategy proof (n − 1)-approximation mechanism is given by choosing lt(x) and rt(x) given the location profile x ∈ R n . In brief, the reason is that lt(x) ∈ L(x) and rt(x) ∈ R(x). The gap between this result and the lower bound given by Theorem 4.1 is still huge; this gap was very recently closed by Lu et al. [2010] (see Section 4.3).
Maximum Cost
Let us now turn to strategyproof mechanisms that approximate the maximum cost. Similarly to the social cost objective, the problem of locating two facilities in a way that minimizes the maximum cost is computationally straightforward. Moreover, we can give a very accurate characterization of the structure of the optimal solution. We shall first require some notation.
Given x ∈ R n , let the left boundary location be lb(x) = max {x i : i ∈ N, x i ≤ cen(x)}, and the right boundary location be rb(x) = min {x i : i ∈ N, x i ≥ cen(x)}. Now, denote dist(x) = max{lb(x) − lt(x), rt(x) − rb(x)}. The following lemma is the foundation of the positive results in this section. LEMMA 4.2. Given x ∈ R n , the optimal placement of two facilities has a maximum cost of dist(x)/2.
PROOF. As usual, we can assume without loss of generality (by scaling the distances) that lt(x) = 0, rt(x) = 1; further, assume without loss of generality that lb(x) ≥ 1 − rb(x), that is, dist(x) is defined by lb(x). We shall first show that there is a solution with the announced cost. Indeed, let y * with y * 1 = lb(x)/2, y * 2 = (rb(x) + 1)/2. It holds that mc(y * , x) = lb(x)/2 ≤ 1/4.
We argue that any solution must have a cost of at least lb(x)/2. Indeed, consider first a solution y, where y 1 ≤ 1/2 and y 2 ≤ 1/2, or y 1 ≥ 1/2 and y 2 ≥ 1/2; then mc(y, x) ≥ 1/2, making this solution inferior to y * . Now, given that the solution only locates one facility y 1 to the left of 1/2, we can assume that y 2 ≥ 3/4; otherwise, the cost is at least 1/4. Any location such that |y 1 − lb(x)/2| = > 0 has a cost of at least lb(x)/2+ , incurred by its distance to either 0 or lb(x). We conclude that the maximum cost is at least lb(x)/2. Deterministic Mechanisms. Given our experience with the single facility case and Lemma 4.2, obtaining a 2-approximation, group strategyproof, deterministic mechanism is quite straightforward: given x ∈ R n , simply select the leftmost location lt(x) and the rightmost location rt(x). Indeed, the maximum cost of our solution is dist(x), whereas the maximum cost of the optimal solution, by Lemma 4.2, is dist(x)/2. We have obtained the following theorem.
THEOREM 4.3. f (x) = lt(x), rt(x) is a group strategyproof 2-approximation mechanism for the maximum cost in the two facility setting.
As for lower bounds, notice that when there are two agents, it is possible to obtain an optimal strategyproof solution by selecting the locations of the two agents. When n ≥ 3, however, we can use a variation on the construction in the proof of Theorem 3.2. COROLLARY 4.4. Let N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 3. Any deterministic strategyproof mechanism f : R n → R 2 has an approximation ratio of at least 2 for the maximum cost in the two facility setting.
PROOF SKETCH. Use the same construction as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 for n − 1 agents, and locate an additional agent at, say, 10 in all the location profiles used in the proof. In order to get a 2-approximation, one of the two facilities must always be close to 10, whereas the same arguments as before apply to the second facility and the rest of the agents.
Randomized Mechanisms. We just saw that with respect to deterministic mechanisms, the results from Section 3 carry over quite smoothly to the two-facility setting. This is no longer true with respect to randomized mechanisms, for a variety of reasons.
We consider the following mechanism. It is inspired by Mechanism 1 but requires several additional new ideas: randomizing over two equal intervals, unbalanced weights at the edges, and correlation between the two facilities. These "tricks" play a crucial role in satisfying the delicate strategyproofness constraints associated with the two facility setting.
Mechanism 2. Given x ∈ R n , compute dist(x). Return y according to the following probability distribution: lt(x), rt(x) with probability 1/2, lt(x) + dist(x), rt(x) − dist(x) with probability 1/6, and lt(x) + dist(x)/2, rt(x) − dist(x)/2 with probability 1/3.
The unbalanced weights inevitably harm the mechanism's approximation performance. Nevertheless, we shall demonstrate that Mechanism 2 succeeds in breaking the deterministic lower bound of 2 by a significant margin. THEOREM 4.5. Mechanism 2 is a strategyproof 5/3-approximation mechanism for the maximum cost in the two facility setting.
PROOF. Let us first tackle the easy claim about the approximation ratio of the mechanism. Given x, with probability 1/3, the output of the mechanism has a maximum cost of dist(x)/2. With probability 2/3, the output has a maximum cost of dist(x). Hence, the expected maximum cost of the mechanism of (5/6) · dist(x). By Lemma 4.2, the optimal solution has a maximum cost of dist(x)/2. The ratio of the two expressions is 5/3.
Let us now turn to proving strategyproofness. Let x ∈ R n be a location profile. Consider some agent i ∈ N. We have that either
; assume without loss of generality that x i ∈ [ lt(x), lt(x) + dist(x)]. Denoting Mechanism 2 by f , let us compute the cost of agent i when x is reported.
We analyze a deviation x i = x i of agent i ∈ N. Define a location profile x ∈ R n such that x j = x j for every agent j = i. The proof proceeds by a case analysis. Case 1. x i ∈ [ lt(x), ∞). In this case, x i is at least as close to lt(x ), lt(x ) + dist(x )/2, and lt(x ) + dist(x ) as to rt(x ), rt(x ) − dist(x )/2 and rt(x ) − dist(x ), respectively. Therefore, we can ignore the location the mechanism selects for the right facility y 2 and concentrate on the location of the left facility y 1 . We examine two subcases. Subcase 1.1. lt(x) < lt(x ). Crucially, in this case x i = lt(x). We wish to claim that
This is trivial if lt(x ) ≥ lt(x) + dist(x), so we can assume that lt(x ) < lt(x) + dist(x). Now, if lt(x) + dist(x) = lb(x), and since we have that cen(x) < cen(x ), it must hold that lb(x ) ≥ lt(x) + dist(x), hence Eq. (2) holds. If rt(x) − dist(x) = rb(x) and rb(x) ≤ cen(x ), then Eq. (2) trivially holds, since then lb(x ) ≥ rb(x). Finally, assume that rt(x) − dist(x) = rb(x) and rb(
where the second inequality holds since rt(x ) ≥ rt(x). Therefore, Eq. (2) follows from the fact that lt(x) < lt(x ). Using Eq. (2), we have that lt(
In other words, the distance between x i and the locations that the mechanism randomizes over only increases as a result of the deviation. Hence, the cost of agent i can only increase from the deviation. Subcase 1.2. lt(x) = lt(x ). We examine three subsubcases.
. In this subsubcase, the probability distribution over the location of y 1 does not change as a result of the deviation, so i does not benefit. 4 Subcase 1.2.2. dist(x ) < dist(x). An important observation in the current subsubcase is that x i = lt(x) + dist(x), that is, x i defines the border of the interval over which the mechanism randomizes. Indeed, we have assumed that
, then either there is an agent j = i such that x j = lt(x) + dist(x) or x j = rt(x) − dist(x); notice that in the latter case it also holds that x j ≥ lt(x) + dist(x). Since x j = x j , it must be the case that dist(x ) ≥ dist(x). See Figure 1 for an illustration. It follows from the observation and from the fact that lt(x) = lt(x ) (since we are in Case 1.2) that in our current subsubcase,
and x i − lt(x) = x i − lt(x ). As in Subcase 1.1, the distance between x i and the locations that the mechanism randomizes over only increases as a result of the deviation, so the cost of agent i increases from the deviation.
where the last transition follows from Eq. (1).
Case 2. x i ∈ (−∞, lt(x))
. Let x i = lt(x) − , > 0. We examine two subcases.
Subcase 2.1. x i ≤ cen(x ). Informally, the deviation in Case 2 affects the location of cen(x ). However, as long as x i ≤ cen(x )), x i must be at least as close to lt(x ), lt(x ) + dist(x )/2, and lt(x ) + dist(x ) as to rt(x ), rt(x ) − dist(x )/2 and rt(x ) − dist(x ), respectively. Therefore, as in Case 1, in Subcase 2.1, we can focus on the distance of x i from y 1 when we calculate the cost of agent i.
We claim that in Subcase 2.1,
Indeed, assume first that dist(x ) = lb(x ) − lt(x ). Since cen(x) > cen(x ), we have that lb(x ) < cen(x), and hence
This concludes the proof of Equation (3). We break the rest of the analysis of Case 2.1 into two subsubcases. Informally, in this subsubcase, agent i was not "supposed" to affect the value of dist(x ). We claim that in this subsubcase, dist(x ) ≥ dist(x). Indeed, if dist(x) = rt(x) − rb(x), then the claim follows from the facts that cen(x ) < cen(x) and rt(x) = rt(x ). If dist(x) = lb(x) − lt(x), with x k located at lb(x), then the claim follows from the fact that both
. We are using the assumption of Subsubcase 2.1.1 about x j in the following way: it might be true that k = i in the preceding arguments, but in that case, we are guaranteed that there exists j = i such that x j is at least as close as x k to cen(x ); therefore, we can use the location of x j to bound dist(x ).
It holds that lt(x ) = lt(x) − . Further, since dist(x ) ≥ dist(x), and by Eq. (3) also dist(x ) ≤ dist(x) + , we have the following inequalities:
Subsubcase 2.1.2. |x j −cen(x )| > |x i −cen(x )| for all agents j = i. In this subsubcase, it may not be true that dist(x ) ≥ dist(x). Rather than relying on this inequality, we must rely on the location of agent i.
First, we notice that by the arguments in Subsubcase 2.1.1, it must hold that
Now, if dist(x) ≤ dist(x ), we can use the same arguments we used previously, so let us assume that dist(x) = dist(x ) + for some > 0. We have that lt(x ) + dist(x ) = lt(x) + dist(x) − ( + ), and hence, by Eq. (4),
Furthermore, we have that
Hence, in particular, Note: UB and LB stand for upper bound and lower bound, respectively. SP and GSP stand for strategyproof and group strategyproof, respectively.
The reader is encouraged to verify that using the arguments of Subcase 2.1, it is sufficient to show that
Notice that since x i > cen(x ) and x i = cen(x ), we may measure the cost of agent i with respect to the location of the right facility y 2 . We have that
On the other hand,
By similar calculations as before, we get that
As in the deterministic case, we observe that the lower bound of 3/2 given in Theorem 3.4 also holds, up to an additive term of , in our current setting, as long as n ≥ 3. COROLLARY 4.6. Let N = {1, . . . , n}, and let > 0. Any randomized strategyproof mechanism has an approximation ratio of at least 3/2 − for the maximum cost in the two facility setting. PROOF SKETCH. We use the same construction as in the proof of Theorem 3.4 for n− 1 agents and add an additional agent located at a large enough value v( ) that depends on . Now, in order to obtain a small approximation ratio, the expected distance of the right facility y 2 from v( ) must be small, hence the probability that y 2 is relevant to the first n − 1 agents can be made arbitrarily small. We conclude that the arguments of the proof of Theorem 3.4 work here as well, up to an arbitrarily small additive term.
Discussion and Subsequent Work
Table II summarizes the results of Section 4. A truly intriguing gap is the one between the trivial n − 1 strategyproof upper bound for the social cost and the lower bound of 3/2. Our lower bound was improved to 2 by Lu et al. [2009] and was very recently improved again to (n−1)/2 by Lu et al. [2010] . This last result is asymptotically tight and implies that there are no nontrivial deterministic SP mechanisms for the social cost. Lu et al. [2010] complement their deterministic SP lower bound with a surprising randomized SP upper bound of 4, which is obtained via a natural mechanism. Currently, the best randomized SP lower bound is 1.045 [Lu et al. 2009 ].
An open problem is the gap between our randomized upper bound of 5/3 for the maximum cost and the lower bound of 3/2. Moreover, it is unclear whether Mechanism 2 is group strategyproof.
A natural way to further extend the results of this section is to consider a setting with more than two facilities. The computational problems involved are still tractable when the number of facilities is constant. However, the intuitions behind the positive results given in this section (i.e., Theorems 4.3 and 4.5), as well as the randomized mechanism of Lu et al. [2010] , already collapse, even with respect to three facilities.
EXTENSION II: MULTIPLE LOCATIONS PER AGENT
Another natural extension of the setting of Section 3 is the one in which each agent controls multiple locations. Let w i be the number of locations controlled by agent i ∈ N; these numbers are public information. We denote the set of locations that agent i controls by x i = x i1 , . . . , x iw i , and the location profile is now x = x 1 , . . . , x n . A deterministic mechanism in the multiple locations setting is a function f : R w 1 × · · · × R w n → R, that locates a single facility given the multiple locations reported by each agent. As in Section 3, a randomized mechanism returns a probability distribution over R.
As before, we will be interested in minimizing the social cost or the maximum cost, but now we make different assumptions about an agent's cost depending on the objective function we are considering. If the objective function is minimizing the social cost, given a facility location y, the cost of an agent is the sum of distances to its locations: cost(y, x i ) = sc(y, x i ) = w i j=1 |y − x ij |. If the goal is minimizing the maximum cost, then the cost of an agent is the maximum distance to its locations: cost(y,
The same goes for randomized mechanisms with respect to expected costs. Notice that when the individual costs are defined as before, optimizing the social cost is in fact equivalent to minimizing the sum of distances to all the locations controlled by all the agents, that is, choosing y that minimizes i∈N j∈{1,...,w i } |y − x ij |. Optimizing the maximum cost implies minimizing the maximum distance with respect to all the locations controlled by all the agents, that is, minimizing max i∈N max j∈{1,...,w i } |y − x ij |.
Social Cost
As in Section 4, when moving from the basic setting to this more elaborate setting, optimization of the social cost is no longer strategyproof. To see this, consider a simple example with two agents. Let x 1 = 0, 1, 1 and x 2 = 0, 0 . The optimal solution is the median of all the locations, which is 0; we have that cost(0, x 1 ) = 2. However, by reporting x 1 = 1, 1, 1 , agent 1 can move the median of all the locations to 1; notice that cost(1, x 1 ) = 1, hence agent 1 benefits from misreporting its locations.
Deterministic Mechanisms. Dekel et al. [2010] have in fact investigated our current setting (i.e., optimizing the social cost when each agent controls multiple locations) with respect to deterministic mechanisms, in the context of incentive compatible regression learning. Some of their results (Section 4 of [Dekel et al. 2010] ) deal with a discrete setting where one wishes to optimize the social cost under the absolute loss function, when the function class is the class of constant functions; it can be verified, although it is not immediately obvious, that the two settings are equivalent. Note that the results of Dekel et al. are stated under the assumption that the agents all control the same number of points, that is, w i = w j for all i, j ∈ N, but they also hold when this is not the case.
The following mechanism (essentially) was suggested by Dekel et al.
Mechanism 3. Given x, create a location profile x , where for all i ∈ N,
In other words, Mechanism 3 projects the w i locations of agent i onto its median and then selects the median among the modified locations. In essence, Mechanism 3 simply lies optimally for the agents, given that the median location is being selected. Dekel et al. proved the following theorem. There is w ∈ N such that, even when w 1 = w 2 = w, any strategyproof deterministic mechanism f : R w × R w → R has an approximation ratio of at least 3 − for the social cost in the multiple locations setting.
Randomized Mechanisms. Dekel et al. [2010] did not discuss randomized mechanisms. We design a simple randomized mechanism that succeeds in breaking the deterministic lower bound given by Dekel et al. [2010] .
Mechanism 4. Given x, return med(x i ) with probability w i /( j∈N w j ).
This mechanism is strategyproof. Indeed, for each agent i ∈ N, agent i has single peaked preferences with a peak at med(x i ). Consider a situation where i lies; if it is not selected by the mechanism, the lie does not make a difference; if i is selected, then it can only be worse off.
However, somewhat counterintuitively and in contrast to the group strategyproof mechanism given by Dekel et al., Mechanism 4 is not group strategyproof; this is demonstrated by the following example.
Example 5.3 (Mechanism 4 is not group strategyproof). Let N = {1, 2}, and set x 1 = −3, −2, 1 and x 2 = −1, 2, 3 . The medians are med(x 1 ) = −2, med(x 2 ) = 2, and each is selected by Mechanism 4 with probability 1/2. Hence, denoting Mechanism 4 by f , we have that for both agents i ∈ N,
On the other hand, consider the location profile x , where both agents report all their locations to be at 0. Then f (x ) selects 0 with probability one. Hence, for all i ∈ N, cost(x i , f (x )) = 6. This means that both agents strictly benefit from the deviation from x to x .
We now turn to establishing the approximation guarantees provided by Mechanism 4. If med(x 1 ) = med(x 2 ), then the algorithm always selects the median med(x). Hence, we can assume without loss of generality that x 1 < x 2 . Slightly abusing notation,
is the median of x 1 and med(x 2 ) is the median of x 2 , we have that
that is, at most half the points are to the left of med(x 1 ). Similarly, at most half the points are to the right of med(x 2 ). Hence, we can choose med(x) (breaking ties in case of an even w 1 + w 2 ) such that med(x) ∈ [med(x 1 ), med(x 2 )]. Let 1 = med(x) − med(x 1 ) be the distance between med(x 1 ) and med(x), let 2 = med(x 2 ) − med(x), and let = 1 + 2 = med(x 2 ) − med(x 1 ) (see Figure 3 for an illustration). Let us calculate the cost of choosing med(x 1 ) or med(x 2 ). It holds that
Hence, denoting Mechanism 4 by f , the expected cost of the mechanism is
It holds that sc(med(x 1 ), B) + sc(med(x 2 ), B) = · b , and a + b + c = w 1 + w 2 . Applying these two equalities to Eq. (5) and assuming without loss of generality that w 1 ≤ w 2 , we get the first transition in the following.
We presently calculate the cost of the optimal solution.
. (7) We upper bound the ratio sc(f (x), x)/sc(med(x), x) by dropping common terms from both the numerator and the denominator, that is, dropping the common terms of Eqs. (6) and (7). Therefore,
where the third transition follows from the fact that med(x 1 ) is the median of x 1 and med(x 2 ) is the median of x 2 .
In particular, the theorem implies that Mechanism 4 gives a 2-approximation when there are two agents that control the same number of points, which is a setting where the deterministic lower bound of 3 (given in [Dekel et al. 2010] ) holds. The theorem was extended beyond two agents by Lu et al. [2009] (see Section 5.3).
We now construct an example that serves two purposes. First, the example shows that Mechanism 4 does not provide an approximation ratio better than 3 − 2/n when there are n agents, even when the agents control the same number of locations, and thus does not significantly beat the deterministic lower bound of 3 when the number of agents is large. Second, the example demonstrates the tightness of the upper bound given in Theorem 5.4, that is, when there are two agents with w 1 and w 2 points, the mechanism does not obtain an approximation ratio better than 2 +
Example 5.5 (Lower Bounds for the Approximation Ratio of Mechanism 4). We first establish that when N = {1, . . . , n}, given > 0, there is w ∈ N large enough such that even when each agent controls exactly w locations, the approximation ratio given by Mechanism 4 is at least 3 − 2 n − . Let w = 2k+1, where k is to be chosen later. Construct a location profile x as follows. For agent 1, we have x 11 , . . . , x 1,k+1 = 0, and x 1,k+2 , . . . , x 1,2k+1 = 1. For all j ≥ 2 and all l = 1, . . . , w, x jl = 1. Notice that med(x 1 ) = 0. With probability 1/n, the algorithm returns 0 and has a social cost of (n − 1)(2k + 1) + k. With probability (n − 1)/n, the algorithm selects 1 and has a social cost of k + 1. The ratio is
To prove the claim, choose k > 1/ − 1. Interestingly, the same example also shows a lower bound of 2 + |w 1 −w 2 | w 1 +w 2 − in the setting of Theorem 5.4, by choosing w 1 = 2k + 1, w 2 = (n − 1)(2k + 1). The analysis is as before with respect to agent 1, whereas agent 2 replaces agents 2, . . . , n. In this case,
Maximum Cost
Our last object of interest is mechanisms for minimizing the maximum cost in the setting where each agent i ∈ N controls w i locations. Similarly to Section 4, we shall demonstrate that the results of Section 3 can be leveraged to obtain tight or nearly tight results in the current setting. A crucial observation is that given an agent i ∈ N, its location profile x i ∈ R w i , and a facility location y ∈ R,
Hence, when cost(y, x i ) = mc(y, x i ), the preferences of the agents are single peaked with the peak at cen(x i ), and moreover, their utility depends only on the distance
Deterministic Mechanisms. In previous settings, we have seen that it is straightforward to obtain a deterministic strategyproof 2-approximation mechanism for the maximum cost. The reason (implicitly underlying the result of Section 4) was that returning any location between lt(x) and rt(x) yields a 2-approximation. The same logic also delivers in our current setting.
Given x ∈ R w 1 × · · · × R w n , we define the vector multicen(x) = cen(x 1 ), . . . , cen(x n ) . This is the vector of the centers of the agents' location profiles or, in other words, the vector of the peaks of the agents' preferences. Hence, choosing the leftmost center, lt(multicen(x)), is a group strategyproof solution. Moreover, we have that lt(x) ≤ lt(multicen(x)) ≤ rt(x), so mc(lt(multicen(x), x) ≤ rt(x) − lt(x), whereas the optimal solution has a maximum cost of at least (rt(x) − lt(x))/2. We have proved the following. THEOREM 5.6. f (x) = lt(multicen(x)) is a group strategyproof 2-approximation mechanism for the maximum cost in the multiple location setting.
Since, in the current setting, we can have that w i = 1 for all i ∈ N, any lower bound from Section 3 holds here as well. In particular, Theorem 3.2 provides a tight lower bound of 2.
Randomized Mechanisms. In order to obtain randomized mechanisms for the maximum cost in the multiple location setting, we once again leverage the techniques of Section 3. Consider the following mechanism, which is an extension of Mechanism 1.
Mechanism 5. Given x ∈ R w 1 × · · · R w n , return lt(multicen(x)) with probability 1/4, rt(multicen(x)) with probability 1/4, and cen(multicen(x)) = (lt(multicen(x)) + rt(multicen(x)))/2 with probability 1/2. Note: UB and LB stand for upper bound and lower bound, respectively. SP and GSP stand for strategyproof and group strategyproof, respectively.
The following theorem establishes that the mechanism has some very desirable properties.
THEOREM 5.7. Mechanism 5 is a group strategyproof 3/2-approximation mechanism for the maximum cost in the multiple location setting.
PROOF. It can easily be verified that using Eq. (8), the group strategyproofness of the mechanism follows from exactly the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.3. Therefore, we concentrate on establishing the announced approximation ratio.
Let x ∈ R n . Without loss of generality (by scaling the distances), we assume that lt(x) = 0, rt(x) = 1. We first claim that lt(multicen(x)) ≤ 1/2. Indeed, let i ∈ N be the agent that controls 0. Then, lt(x i ) = 0, rt(x i ) ≤ 1, hence cen(x i ) ≤ 1/2. The claim directly follows. Similarly, we have that rt(multicen(x)) ≥ 1/2. In other words, it holds that lt(multicen(x)) is at least as close to 0 as to 1, whereas rt(multicen(x)) is at least as close to 1 as to 0. Therefore, denoting Mechanism 5 by f , we have mc(f (x), x) = 1 4 · (1 − lt(multicen(x))) + 1 4 · rt(multicen(x)) + 1 2 · max lt(multicen(x)) + rt(multicen(x)) 2 , 1 − lt(multicen(x)) + rt(multicen(x)) 2 = max 1 4 + rt(multicen(x)) 2 , 3 4 − lt(multicen(x)) 2 ≤ 3 4 , where the last inequality follows from the fact that lt(multicen(x)) ≥ 0 and rt(multicen(x)) ≤ 1. The optimal solution has a cost of 1/2. Therefore, we get an approximation ratio of 3/2.
Finally, we remark that the randomized lower bound of 3/2 given by Theorem 3.4 holds here as well. We find it quite surprising that the upper bound yielded by the seemingly "generous" Mechanism 5 is tight.
Discussion and Subsequent Work
Table III summarizes the results of Section 5. The most interesting question is how the analysis of Mechanism 4 extends to n > 2. In the conference version of this article, we conjectured that for any number of agents n, if w i = w j for all i, j ∈ N, then the mechanism yields an approximation ratio of 3 − 2/n. Such a result is tight by the Example 5.5. This conjecture was in fact confirmed by Lu et al. [2009] . Moreover, these authors established a randomized lower bound of 1.33 with respect to the social cost by solving a related linear program.
The setting investigated in this section has many applications, but we note that, in particular, any results about randomized strategyproof mechanisms for the social cost can be directly applied in the incentive compatible regression learning setting of Dekel et al. [2010] .
OPEN PROBLEMS AND FUTURE WORK
Subsequent papers have considered some of the natural extensions of our model, including the setting where the agents are located on a graph or even a general metric space [Alon et al. 2010; Lu et al. 2010] . We suggest additionally considering allotment rules, namely, rules that assign a point a i ∈ [0, 1] to each agent such that i∈N a i = 1; this setting models the division of a task or a good among the agents [Barberà 2001, Section 4 .1]. Furthermore, it is possible to consider almost any combination of the extensions, for example, a domain in which agents control multiple locations (as in Section 5) and two facilities must be located (as in Section 4). However, in our opinion, the most important technical open problem is the extension of the results of Section 4, as well as the subsequent results of Lu et al. [2009 Lu et al. [ , 2010 , to settings with three facilities and beyond.
As noted in Section 2, the conceptual ideas that were first presented in this work have already been applied to at least five other fundamentally different domains. We believe that the most influential future work would unify some of the mechanisms that were developed for these domains. Indeed, some of the basic ideas, such as choosing the optimal solution with certain probability and a suboptimal solution with the complement probability (as realized by Mechanism 1), are used again and again. We are therefore hopeful that it would prove feasible to develop approximate mechanisms without money that provide general guarantees across domains.
